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A Few Straight Men:
Homosexuals In The Military And
Equal Protection
by

Alafair S.R. Burke
An issue almost
wholly ignored by the
media and the
government is
whether the "don't
ask, don't tell"
compromise is
constitutional.

servicemembers from being open
about their sexual orientation.
Although "don't ask,
don't tell" is less restrictive than a
complete ban on gay and lesbian
servicemembers, gay rights advocates were less than enthusiastic
about the compromise. During
the 1992 presidential campaign,
then-candidate Bill Clinton promhave to modify, if not revoke, its
discriminatory policy of banning all gays and lesbians from ised to revoke the ban on homosexuals in the military once he
service solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. As was elected. But when Clinton failed to discard the ban in a
discussions among the military, the Executive, and members swift order during his first months as Commander in Chief,
of Congress progressed, the policy of "don't ask, don't tell" opponents of the military's policy feared that Clinton was
emerged as the most likely compromise. The "don't ask" retreating from his promise to remove the ban completely in
prong of this policy requires the rnlitary to cease its prior favor of a more politically-palatable compromise. In Nopractice of asking new recruits about their sexual orientation vember 1993, the fears of those who opposed the ban became
and provides that sexual orientation as a status no longer a reality when Congress adopted and President Clinton
constitutes grounds for discharge. On the other hand, the signed a version of "don't ask, don't tell" as part of the 1993
"don't tell" prong of the policy generally prohibits gay military budget.' The adopted version of "don't ask, don't
tell" prohibits the military from discriminating against
Alafair Burke is a 1994 graduate of Stanford Law School. The servicemembers solely on the basis of homosexual orientaauthorthanks KaraBurkeforherextensive editingassistancewith tion and purports to move the military's focus onto a
thisarticle.
servicemember's sexual conduct, rather than his status. In
Until relatively recently,
the military's policy of actively
discovering and discharging homosexual servicemembers solely
on the basis of their sexual orientation had escaped mainstream
public criticism. But with the
Clinton Administration came a
realization thatthe military would
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other words, although a servicemember may be discharged
if he engages in "homosexual acts, ' 2 in theory his sexual
orientation alone no longer constitutes grounds for dismissal. The practical effect of the rule, however, is to permit
closeted homosexuals to remain in the military while forcing
out open gays. Under the new rules, a servicemember's
acknowledgement that he is homosexual constitutes a sufficient basis to oust him from the military unless he can
demonstrate that he "is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends
to engage in homosexual acts."3 In other words, the policy
creates a presumption that an acknowledged homosexual
engages in homosexual acts, forcing the servicemember to
have the burden of proving that he has not and will not
4
engage in such acts.
Its punishment of acknowledged homosexual
servicemembers is not the only respect in which the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy falls short of its promise to focus solely
on sexual conduct rather than on sexual orientation. Although the policy ended the military's prior practice of
questioning new servicemembers about their sexual orientation, the rules allow the Secretary of Defense to reinstate the
practice at his discretion. Similarly, the compromise allows
the military to investigate suspected homosexuals as it
deems necessary. Finally, Congress failed to include a
requirement that the military maintain even-handed enforcement of its Code of Conduct, which prohibits both
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, thereby inviting the
pre-compromise practice of enforcing the sodomy restriction only against homosexuals.5
The adoption of Congress' version of "don't ask,
don't tell" followed a months-long debate between the
Legislature and Executive regarding what, as a matter of
public policy and national defense, would be the best approach to resolving the perceived tensions among civil
rights, "traditional" values, homogeneity in the ranks, and
national security. An issue almost wholly ignored by the
media and the government, however, is whether the "don't
ask, don't tell" compromise is constitutional. The debate
surrounding the issue of gays and the military seems to
assume that the military, Legislature, and Executive may
enact and enforce any policy they collectively decide is wise.
Meanwhile, the Judiciary has engaged in its own debate, one
that turns more on abstract legal doctrine than on heated
rhetoric.
This article explores the validity of the "don't ask,
don't tell" compromise under the Equal Protection Clause of
the FifthAmendment. Regardless ofthe fact that any version
of the policy is less restrictive than the military's former
complete ban, the "don't ask, don't tell" compromise actu-

110

ally opens the door to constitutional challenges that were
largely unsuccessful in the past. Consequently, the tremendous effort spent to reach apolitically-palatable compromise
may in fact destroy the deference that the military traditionally has enjoyed from the courts. The current effort simply
to loosen the ban may lead, therefore, to its complete
invalidation.
DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY
Although the principle of military deference is
sufficiently broad to warrant an entire article, no examina-

Regardless of the fact that any
version of the policy is less
restrictive than the military's
former complete ban, the
"don't ask, don't tell"
compromise actually opens the
door to constitutional
challenges that were largely
unsuccessful in the past.
tion of the relationship between the military and the courts
would be complete without a basic understanding of the
deference that the judiciary generally applies to claims
brought against the military or claims that touch on issues of
national security. The Supreme Court has statedthatbecause
"the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate
from civilian society,"6 the Court's judicial review of military regulations "is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society."7
In establishing this principle, the Court has offered
remarkably broad language that, if interpreted withoutqualification, could open the door to the complete subordination
of all individual rights to the needs of the military. The Court
has written, for example, that "[t]he military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such
tolerance is required of the civilian state by the FifthAmendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster
instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de
corps."' In fact, according to the Court, "the essence of
military service 'is the subordination of the desires and
interests of the individual to the needs of the service."' In
addition, the Court has tended to seeitselfas "ill-equipped"10
to second guess the judgments of the military, because
"Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of
balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the
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military."
In the past, courts have followed the disturbing
lead created by such broad language to hold that homosexuals may not challenge the military's decision to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation. In Woodward v. United
States, for example, the Federal Circuit rejected such a
challenge, stating that "[s]pecial deference must be given by
a court to the military when adjudicating matters involving
their decisions on discipline, morale, composition and the
the
like, and a court should not substitute its views for
'considered professional judgment' of the military.' 2
This deferential theme is echoed in Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh,where the Seventh Circuit wrote about the military's
ban on homosexuals: "It would be difficult to think of a
clearer example of the type of governmental action that was
intended by the Constitution to be left to the political
branches directly responsible-as the judicial branch is not
-- to the electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping,
and control of a military force are essentially professional
control of the
military judgments, subject always to civilian
13
Branches."'
Executive
Legislative and
The Court has not, however, completely abjured its
responsibility to review the decisions of the military. The
Court has explicitly stated that "aspects of military life do
not, of course, render entirely nugatory in the military
contextthe guarantees" of the Constitution.' 4 Thus, "simply
labeling the legislative decision 'military' ...

does not

automatically guide a court to the correct constitutional
result."' 5 In particular, courts are still obligated underArticle
m91 to decide whether or not an individual's right to equal
protection has been violated, even if it so happens that the
alleged violator is the United States military.' 6 As Justice
Ginsburg stated recently, "men and women in the Armed
Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial
7
protection behind when they enter military service."'
AN ARGUMENT FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY?
Claims brought underthe Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment have been the most common
challenge to the use of sexual orientation as a basis for
discharge from the military. The likelihood of success of an
equal protection challenge turns inpart on the level of
scrutiny that the court applies to the military's practice of
treating heterosexual and homosexual servicemembers differently. Three standards ofreview existunderequalprotection analysis: strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and rational basis review. Strict scrutiny applies to classifications
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that either"operate to the disadvantage of some suspect class
or impinge upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution."' 8 Heightened scrutiny is
proper when the classification disadvantages a "quasi-suspect' class such as gender, alienage, or ilegitimacy.' 9 In all
other cases, the rational basis test is applied. 20
Under the most stringent test, strict scrutiny, a
classification violates the Equal Protection Clause unless it
is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest." 2' Because the test is "strict in theory, but fatal in
fact,"' the military's policy of differentiating between heterosexual and homosexual servicemembers would almost
certainly fail this stringent review. Strict scrutiny, however,
is applied only to classifications that either burden a suspect
class or infringe on the exercise of a fundamental right. It is
unlikely that a court will define homosexuals as a suspect
class, as this category traditionally has been limited to race,
national origin, and, occasionally, alienage.
A lower level of scrutiny is available if homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, similar to gender or
illegitimacy. Under the intermediate scrutiny applicable to
discrimination against such classes, the military's policy
would fail unless it was "substantially related to a legitimate
state interest. ' ' 3 To qualify as a quasi-suspect class, a group
must: 1)suffer a history of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define
them as a discrete group; and 3) be politically powerless. 24
Application of the Three-ProngTest to Homosexuals
Although federal courts have yetto considerhomosexuals a quasi-suspect class, 5 there are good arguments
that they should. First, gays and lesbians have suffered a
clear history of purposeful discrimination. Discrimination
against homosexuals has been pervasive in boththe public
and private sectors. Legislative bodies have excluded homosexuals from certain jobs and schools, and have prevented homosexual marriage. In the private sphere, homosexuals continue to face discrimination injobs, housing, and
churches. Moreover, reports of violence against homosexuals have become commonplace in our society. In sum, the
discrimination faced by homosexuals is plainly no less
pernicious or intense than the discrimination faced by other
groups already treated as suspect classes, such as aliens or
people of a particular national origin.2
Furthermore, gays and lesbians are the victims of
some of society's most vicious stereotypes. Many members
of society continue to view homosexuals as promiscuous,
mentally ill, or sexually deviate. The history of discrimination against gays and lesbians is clear, and even courts that
have rejected the argument that homosexuals comprise a
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protected class have conceded that they fulfill at least the
initial criterion for intermediate scrutiny.27
The second prong of the heightened scrutiny test
requires that the group seeking heightened protection display an obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristic. Because there is no consensus among the public, legal
scholars, gay activists, or scientists whether homosexuality
represents a voluntary choice or a genetically determined
trait, 28 the immutability requirement is the most difficult
hurdle to establishing sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect
classification. But regardless of the outcome of this "nature
versus nurture" debate, it is becoming increasingly clearthat
one's sexual orientation (either by environmental influences
or by genetic fate) is fixed early in life and is unlikely to
change. 29 Gone are the days in which psychologists attempted to "diagnose" and "cure" homosexuals.
The Ninth Circuit in High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Clearance Office3" refused to apply heightened
scrutiny to the military's discrimination against homosexuality. The court reasoned that homosexuality is a "behavioral" trait and therefore not an immutable characteristic for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause." However, alienage,
which the Supreme Court has held to be a fully suspect
classification, is also in some sense behavioral. It is not an
inborn trait: one "chooses" her alienage status when she
leaves her native country. Nor is it an unchangeable status:
one can gain citizenship.
Furthermore, the formulation of this requirement
for heightened scrutiny is that the group "exhibit obvious,
immutable, ordistinguishing characteristics that define them
as a discrete group," not that the group share some trait that
is literally unchangeable. What distinguishes sexual orientation (and alienage) from some other "behavioral" trait,
such as a hobby or a vice, is that it is a defining aspect of a
person's identity. Aperson is as gay while playing bridge as
he is while having sex.12 Moreover, sexual orientation, like
an immutable characteristic, is so unrelated to personal
ability that a classification based on it is more likely to be a
resort to prejudice than to actual differences. 3
In a changing political landscape, application of the
third prong of the heightened scrutiny test to gays and
lesbians has become increasingly controversial. This prong
requires that the group seeking heightened protection lack
the political power necessary to obtain redress from the
political branches of govemment.34 Gays and lesbians
represent a minority of the population3' and are far fewer in
number than women, who enjoy the protection of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, circumstances unique to gays and lesbians prevent
them from organizing politically. Pressures to conceal one's

homosexuality deter gays and lesbians from "coming out of
the closet" and working with others to obtain equal treatment.3 6 And even when the gay community does participate
openly in politics, animus towards homosexuals often prevents elected officials from associating with their causes.
Nevertheless, the perception of gays and lesbians
as a highly organized, powerful lobbying group is increasingly widespread. Arecent national poll revealed that 70%
of the public believes that federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 8 Despite this
common perception, none of the federal civil rights acts
proscribes discrimination based on sexual orientation. Although Senator Edward Kennedy has proposed legislation
that would prohibit employment discrimination against gays
and lesbians, it is not likely to pass this year.39 In contrast,
women and racial minorities are protected by several federal
statutes and by legislation in almost every state.
Despite the lack of federal civil rights protection
for gays and lesbians, the perception that homosexuals as an
already protected class persists. The court in High Tech
Gays, for example, argued that homosexuals are not politically powerless and "have the ability to and do 'attract the
attention of the lawmakers." '4° In support of this claim, the
court cited three state anti-discrimination statutes protecting
homosexuals, 4 only one of which was a comprehensive
statute barring employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. 42 The other two statutes cited by the court
offer only minimal protection to gays and lesbians, and
indicate how vulnerable homosexuals are to a hostile majority. One barred violence based on sexual orientation, 43 and
the other prohibited the denial of care in health facilities on
the basis of sexual orientation." If anything, the court's
short list of support illustrates the sparsity of gay rights
legislation at the state and local levels.
In addition, since High Tech Gays was decided, the
nation has witnessed a notable backlash against the minimal
political collaboration that does exist among gays and lesbians. 4 The fuel for this backlash was a successful 1992
Colorado ballot measure prohibiting the state from enacting
anti-discrimination legislation for gays and lesbians.4 Although the Colorado Supreme Court eventually held that the
measure violated the Colorado Constitution,47 the sparks
from the Colorado amendment ignited intense anti-gay
campaigns across the nation. This year, anti-gay coalitions
attempted to place similar measures on the ballot in ten
states, succeeding in Oregon and Idaho.4 The debate over
whether gays and lesbians deserve basic civil rights exists at
the local level as well: in 1993, nineteen local initiatives
excluding homosexuals from the protection of anti-discrimination laws made it onto the ballot, and every one was
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successful. 4 9
Attempts to target gays and lesbians exist even at
the national level. In its last session, Congress voted overwhelminglytoincludeaprovisionintheImprovingAmerica's
Schools Act that would cut federal funding to any school
"encouraging or supporting homosexuality as a positive
lifestyle alternative," including any school that counsels
students regarding their homosexuality or even refers students to "an organization that affirms a homosexual
lifestyle."50 This provision was approved by a vote of 63-36
in the Senate and 301-120 in the House in total disregard of
the fact that thirty percent of youth suicides occur among
gays and lesbians. 5' Given the frequency and intensity of
anti-gay efforts in the current political climate, the fact that
a handful of states and cities have chosen to protect gays and
lesbians from some forms of discrimination should not

What distinguishes sexual
orientation from some other
"behavioral" trait, such as a
hobby or a vice, is that it is a
defining aspect of a person's
identity. A person is as gay
while playing bridge as he is
while having sex.
prevent courts from treating homosexuality as a quasisuspect classification.
The HardwickHurdle
Despite these persuasive arguments, several courts
have held that the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick 2precludes a holding that gays and lesbians are a
quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause.53 In Hardwick, the Court held
that a state law criminalizing sodomy does not violate the
Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment. Typical
of several courts addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit in
High Tech Gays reasoned that, "by the Hardwickmajority
holding that the Constitution confers no fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, and because homosexual conduct can thus be criminalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to
greater than rational basis review for equal protection purposes." 54
This reasoning distorts the Hardwick decision. The
Supreme Court has never held that a state may criminalize
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homosexual sodomy but permit heterosexual sodomy.
Hardwicksimply heldthat there was no fundamentalrightto
engage in sodomy, and, therefore, that a facially-neutral law
criminalizing sodomy did not violate principles of substantive due process. Although the state conceded in Hardwick
that it could not constitutionally enforce the sodomy restriction against a married couple, 55 this was because of the
Court's traditional protection of marital privacy,6 not because the state or the Court afforded special protection of
heterosexual sodomy over homosexual sodomy.Y In this
regard, Hardwick resembles Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,51 in which the Supreme Court held that a facially-neutral law proscribing the
use of the drug peyote was constitutional, despite the fact
that its impact fell more harshly on a particular religion.
The analytical flaw in High Tech Gays lies in the
assumption thatit is "homosexual conduct" that defines ones
identity as a gay or lesbian. Acelibate homosexual is just as
homosexual as one who engages in "homosexual conduct." 59
The Supreme Court has a history ofrejecting classifications
based on "status" rather than conduct. For example, in
Robinson v. California,60the Court held that, although states
could prohibit actual drug use, they could not criminalize a
person's status as a drug addict. Similarly, in Powell v.
Texas,61 the Court held that a state could prohibit public
alcohol consumption, but could not arrest someone based
solely on his status as a chronic alcoholic. This wellestablished distinction between status and conduct indicates
the irrelevance of the Court's holding in Hardwick to the
debate overthe military's policy towardhomosexuals. Unlike
the sodomy law at issue in Hardwick, the military's traditional treatment of homosexuals has never turned on sexual
conduct; it has always turned on status. Thus, those who
engaged in behavior that could be criminalized under
Hardwick were targeted only if they are homosexual, and
homosexuals were targeted regardless oftheir sexual activities - as Ninth Circuit Judge Canby put it, "that is the key"
to understanding these issues.62
NEW APPLICATION OF THE OLD RATIONAL
BASIS TEST
Because courts have been unwilling to treat homosexuals as a semi-suspect class, the military's policy of
discrimination against homosexuals has been subject only to
rational basis review. This is the lowest level of scrutiny: a
classification will be upheld so long as it is "rationally
related to a legitimate state interest."' ' Traditionally, courts
applying this standard of review have upheld almost every
challenged classification. In light of this tradition and the
courts' general deference to matters within the areas of the
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military and national defense, it is not surprising that equal
protection claims of servicemembers who were discharged
from the military based on their sexual orientation have been
largely unsuccessful.
The bite of the old rational basis test, however, is
becoming increasingly sharp. In Pruitt v. Cheney,6 for
example, a former Army Reserve Officer challenged Army
regulations requiring her discharge because of her homosexuality. The Ninth Circuit held that, when reviewing
classification based on sexual orientation, it will engage in
"active rational basis review" 6 as exemplified by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburnev. CleburneLiving Center,
Inc.' and Palmore v. Sidoti6 Under this level of scrutiny,
the court will "review to see whetherthe government ha[s]
establishedon the recorda rational basis for the challenged
discrimination." Furthermore, the court will not permit the
government to give effect to "private biases."' However,
even "active" rational basis review requires only a "rational"
basis between a challenged classification and a legitimate
governmental interest; it does not require a showing of a
"precisely tailored" or "substantial" relationship between
the two.
Pruittmakes clear that the military will no longer
be allowed to simply rely on older, more deferential standards of review to justify a policy distinguishing among
servicemembers according to sexual orientation, but will
have to introduce evidence into the record that provides a
rational justification for its policies. The remainder of this
section explores the possible justifications for "don't ask,
don't tell" and concludes that, as the military moves away
from its total ban toward "don't ask, don't tell," it simultaneously is destroying its ability to uphold in the courts its
policy regarding homosexuals.
The TraditionalSecurity Rationale
The traditional rationale for the military's ban on
homosexuals is thathomosexual servicemembers are higher
security risks than their heterosexual counterparts. 70 For
example, the military has justified its policy by stating that
"[plarticipation in deviant sexual activities may tend to cast
doubt on the individual's morality, emotional or mental
stability and may raise questions as to his or her susceptibility to coercion or blackmail."'7' The military's definition of
"deviant sexual activities" includes homosexuality along
with bestiality, sadism, necrophilia, and pedophilia.
The evidence supporting the claim that homosexuals pose a security risk has always been shaky. The Crittendon
report,2 a study commissioned by the Department of Defense (DOD) itself, states that the security rationale appears
to have originated in the report of the Hoey Committee, but

that this committee based its recommendation "on the opinions of those best qualified to know, namely, the intelligence
agencies of the Government."73 The Crittendon report
notes, however, that no intelligence agency, as far as can be
ascertained, adduced any factual data before the Committee
with which to support these opinions.7 4 Moreover, the
military, recently forced under active rational basis review to
come forward with evidence supporting its security rationale, has yet to produce anything but anecdotal evidence
regarding a handful of homosexual soldiers. 75

The public debate
i surrounding "don't ask,
don't tell" makes clear that
the public's central concern
is with the reactions of
heterosexual soldiers to
homosexuals, not with the
abilities of homosexuals.
Opponents of the ban on homosexuals in the military have argued for years that the ban bears no rational
relationship to the military's interest in national security.
After all, the risk that a homosexual servicemember will
yield to blackmail attempts because of his sexual orientation
is only increasedwhen the soldier knows he will surely be
discharged if his secret is disclosed by the extortionist.
However, even if the military did not discharge homosexuals, it is plausible (and therefore rational to believe) that,
because of other societal prejudices, homosexual
servicemembers would remain prone to blackmail on the
basis of their sexual orientation. 76 Furthermore, the rational
basis test does not require that the relationship between the
policy and its rationale be a tight one, simply a rational one.
The courts are even more likely to defer to such judgments
when they are made by the military.' As a result, the military
has been able to exclude all discovered homosexuals from
the ranks by arguing that those homosexuals who prefer to
remain in the closet present higher security risks.
Judicial deference to the military, however, can
only go so far. Although courts might have been willing to
accept a classification that tended to overgeneralize within a
group, the courts are not likely to defer to a classification
that, on its face, is the exact opposite classification one
would expect from its stated rationale. In other words, by
moving away from a total ban and toward the "don't ask,
don't tell" compromise, the military has ruined its credibility
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with the courts with regard to the security rationale.
The compromise involved in "don't ask, don't tell"
is that homosexual servicemembers who hide their sexuality
may remain in the military. However, homosexuals who are
open to their families, friends, and their fellow
servicemembers will be subjected to an investigation in
which they shoulder the burden of proving that they do not
engage in acts prohibited by the Code of Conduct. This
policy is the opposite of the only one that could conform to
the military's longstanding security rationale for its ban on
homosexuals in the military. Homosexuals who do not
conceal their sexual orientation cannot be subjected to
blackmail on the issue. On the other hand, closeted homosexuals, who are allowed to remain in the military under
"don't ask, don't tell," will be more likely to succumb to
blackmail attempts in order to keep their secret safe.
In the past, the military has enjoyed a surprising
degree of judicial deference to its unsupported claim that
homosexuals are likely to succumb to blackmail attempts in
order to conceal their sexual orientation. Now, however, by
compromising in the direction of "don't ask, don't tell," the
military has adopted a policy that flies in the face of this
claim. In doing so, the military has destroyed any hope that
it can justify its new policy with the formerly successful
security rationale.
Other Rationalesof the Past
The military has also defended its prior ban on
homosexuals by arguing that, because homosexual conduct
may constitute a criminal violation, such behavior calls into
78
question a servicemember's willingness to uphold the law.
Counterarguments to this claim have always existed. First,
although it is true that sodomy is a criminalizable offense,
sodomy is illegal in only about half the states. 79 Therefore,
not every person who engages in "homosexual conduct" is
violating state law. Moreover, of the states that do maintain
anti-sodomy laws, a clear majority of those laws proscribe
both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, as does the
Military's Code of Conduct. Therefore, if "homosexual
conduct" displays a willingness to violate the law, heterosexual sodomy displays a similar tendency and every
servicemember, regardless of sexual orientation, should be
questioned regarding his private sexual conduct.
President Clinton's earlier version of "don't ask,
don't tell" at least attempted to accommodate these criticisms by focusing on conduct rather than sexual orientation.
His version called for even-handed enforcement of the Code
of Conduct's prohibition on sodomy. In contrast, Congress'
enacted version of the compromise makes no mention of
equal enforcement.
Moreover, a homosexual
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servicemember's open acknowledgement of his sexual orientation is grounds to investigate the soldier for violations of
the Code of Conduct, whereas an openly-heterosexual
servicemember does not suffer similar consequences. Although the government's interestin keeping the military free
from lawless soldiers might justify enforcing the Code of
Conduct's prohibition on sodomy, especially if the Code
were enforced regardless of sexual orientation, it does not
justify a policy that allows homosexuals to remain in the
military only if they simultaneously remain in the closet.
Similarly, "don't ask, don't tell" does not conform
to anotherjustification given for the military's prior all-out
ban: that homosexuals are more likely to have emotional
problems. The Department ofDefense argued to the district
court in High Tech Gays, for example, that "a homosexual
may face emotional tension, instability or other difficulties
since society has not recognized his sexual practice as
mainstream. ' ' 0 It would be difficult enough for the military
to make such an argument when courts increasingly are
recognizing the psychiatric and medical communities' consensus that homosexuality is not a mental disorder.8' However, courts will be especially reluctant to defer to the
military when it allows homosexuals to remain in the military so long as they keep secret their sexual orientation, since
there is no rational basis forbelieving that gays and lesbians
have emotional problems only once they publicly reveal
their homosexuality.
Tension Among the Troops
The downfall of "don't ask, don'ttell" in the courts
should be hastened as it becomes increasingly clear to the
public, and therefore to the courts, that the only rationale
supporting the policy is thatopenly homosexual soldiers will
disruptthe"morale" of the troops. Maintaining morale is the
only possible rationale for apolicy that allows homosexuals
to remain in the military only if they hide their sexual
orientation. Furthermore, the public debate surrounding
"don't ask, don't tell" makes clear that the public's central
concern is with the reactions of heterosexual soldiers to
homosexuals, not with the abilities of homosexuals.
Forexample,ViceAdmiral Ronald Joseph Zlatoper,
Chief ofNaval Personnel and Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations, stated at hearings before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services that the presence of homosexuals in the
Navy has a direct adverse impact on the ability of military
leaders to sustain relationships, instill camaraderie, and
maintain the cohesion necessary for a unit to remain a highly
effective fighting force. The presence in units of individuals
who engage in, desire to engage in, or intend to engage in
homosexual acts polarizes units and undermines the ability
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of a commanding officer to fostergood morale and maintain
an effective chain of command.
Similarly, President Clinton has stated that "The
American people are deeply divided on this issue, with most
military people opposed to lifting the ban because of the
feared impact on unit cohesion, rooted in disapproval of
homosexual lifestyles, and a fear of invasion of privacy of

In designing "don't ask, don't
tell" to accommodate the
negative attitudes of
heterosexual servicemembers toward
gays and lesbians, the
President, Congress, and
military appear to have
disregarded constitutional
requirements established a
decade ago by the Supreme
Court.
heterosexual soldiers. Those who oppose lifting the ban are
clearly focused not on the conduct of individual gay service
members but on how non-gay service members feel about
gays in general and, in particular, those in military ser2
vice."1
In designing "don't ask, don't tell" to accommodate the negative attitudes of heterosexual servicemembers
toward gays and lesbians, the President, Congress, and
military appear to have disregarded constitutional requirements established a decade ago by the Supreme Court. The
Court has made clear that, however deferential it may be to
the government'sjudgments regarding a classification and a
state interest, it will not allow the government to give effect
to "private biases." 3 The Supreme Court first established
this principle in Palmorev. Sidoti,where it held thata mother
could not be denied custody of her child because of social
disapproval of her interracial marriage. In the Court's view,
"the Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither
can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect." 4
In Cityof Cleburnev. CleburneLiving Center,5the
Court once again made clear its unwillingness to permit the
government to invoke private prejudices as ajustification for
discriminatory legislation. In Cleburne,the Court held that
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group homes for the mentally retarded could not be subjected to special zoning requirements simply to protect the
non-retarded from a minority that they feared or despised.
The Court's holding in Cleburneindicated that the Palmore
rationale was not limited to classifications based on race or
that infringed on a fundamental right such as the relationship
between a parent and child; it also applied to classifications
requiring only the rational basis standard of review. In other
words, even though the government need only establish a
rational connection between its chosen classification and the
alleged governmental interest, the government interest still
must be a legitimate one, and the Palmore/Cleburneprinciple establishes that the government has no legitimate
interest in giving effect to private prejudices.
Courts are increasingly relying on Palmore and
Cleburneto hold that, even under the rational basis test, the
military may notjustify its policy regarding homosexuals by
claiming that open homosexuality offends the values of
heterosexual servicemembers.6 Forexample, in 1980, prior
to the Supreme Court's decisions in Palmoreand Cleburne,
the Ninth Circuit in Belier v. Middendorf held that "the
tension between known homosexuals and other members
who despise/detest homosexuality" could justify the
military's ban on homosexuals.8 In 1991, however, the
court made clear in Pruitt that, because of the Supreme
Court's holding in Palmore, the justification accepted in
Belier "should not be given unexamined effect today as a
matter of law."88
Following the Ninth Circuit's lead in Pruitt, a
three-judge panel ofthe D.C. Circuit held in Steffan v. Aspin
that the military's former ban on homosexuals cannot be
justified on the basis that "forcing [heterosexuals] to serve
with homosexuals will lower their morale, impair their
discipline, and discourage them from enlisting."" The
Steffan court reached its holding by relying not only on the
Palmore/Cleburneprinciple, but also on the First Amendment doctrine of the "heckler's veto." That doctrine forbids
the government from silencing controversial speech based
on the reaction of a hostile audience, thereby preventing the
majority or a vocal minority from suppressing disfavored
viewpoints. 90
Both the Palmore/Cleburneprinciple and its First
Amendment analogue, the heckler's veto, establish that a
policy thatdiscriminates against homosexual servicemembers
can bejustified neither by heterosexual dislike nor by fear of
homosexuals. As a recent district court opinion stated:
"Even assuming that homosexuals threaten 'unit cohesion',
the integrity of the system of rank and command, recruiting
of Navy servicemembers, protection of heterosexuals' privacy rights and 'public acceptability' of Navy service, such
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threats can only conceivably arise from: (1) heterosexual
dislike of homosexuals for moral or other reasons; (2)
heterosexuals' apparent fear that they will be victimized,
threatened or harassed by homosexuals, and/or (3) the notion that homosexuals are uniquely incapable of controlling
their sexual desires. Theserationales are directly analogous
to the state court's concern with social disapproval of interracial marriages in Palmoreand the city's concern with the
rlegative attitudes of property owners towards the mentally
retarded in Cleburne, both of which were invalidated as
based on illegitimate prejudice." 9'
The extension of Palmore and Cleburne to discrimination against homosexuals should render it impossible for the military to defend the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy in the courts. One district court has already granted
a preliminary injunction barring the policy's enforcement
against the plaintiffs in that case 2 In doing so, the court
noted that the policy "is really concerned not so much with
'conduct' but with the attitudes of others when they learn of
statements of homosexual orientation. The message to those
with such an orientation appears to be not to avoid private
homosexual acts but to stay in the closet and to hide their
orientation."9
THE CONTINUED DEBATE
Palmoreand Cleburne clearly establish that the
government has no legitimate interestin accommodating the
prejudices of a hostile majority. Both the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Pruittand the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Steffan
recognized that the PalmorelCleburnelogic applies in the
military context. Senior military officials have acknowledged openly that the basis for "don't ask, don't tell" is to
avoidthediscomfortthatheterosexualservicemembers might
experience if forced to serve with homosexual soldiers.
Thus, althoughbothPruittandSteffanaddressedthemilitary's
former policy and not "don't ask, don't tell," one might
nevertheless assume that the decisions would doom the new
policy in the courts.
Recent events in the D.C. and Ninth Circuits,
however, suggest a retreat from Steffan and Pruitt to the
degree that the decisions have erected insurmountable obstacles for the "don't ask, don't tell" compromise. When the
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit announced its decision
in Steffan, the Administration sought full-court review of
only a narrow part of the case. Instead, the full court vacated
the panel's opinion in its entirety and upheld military regulations employing a servicemember's admission of his homosexual orientation as a proxy for determining that he had
engaged in homosexual conduct 4 The court's opinion
reflects a markedly narrow view of thejudicial role. Rather
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than requiring the military to articulate a justification for
discharging openly homosexual servicemembers and then
asking whether that interest is both legitimate and rationally
furthered by the military regulations, the court asked only
whether the policy of banning those who admit that they are
homosexual rationally furthers the end of banning those who
engage in homosexual conduct. In other words, the court did
not require a neutral justification independent from the
military's desire to exclude homosexuals from service. With
such a narrow inquiry, the court determined that the regulations served a rational basis. In doing so, the court cited the
Supreme Court's decisions in Robinson and Powell which
establish that status alone cannot justify punishment, but
limited this principle to the criminal context.
Even the Ninth Circuit appears to be departing
from prior caselaw that suggested the ultimate demise of
"don't ask, don't tell." In its most recent discussion of the
military's former policy, in Meinholdv.UnitedStates Dept.
ofDefense,95the courtheld that the Navy could not discharge
Petty Officer Keith Meinhold simply because he stated on
ABC World News Tonight, "Yes, I am in fact gay."
In Meinhold, the Ninth Circuit recognized that it
must "accommodate" both the principle of military deference and its duty to enforce the Constitution. The court
stated that, to do so, it must "start with the [military's]
professional judgment... that 'homosexuality is incompatible with military service [because] [the presence in the
military environment of persons who engage in homosexual
conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the
'
accomplishment of the military mission."'
The court held that the military undoubtedly could
proscribe homosexual conduct, butrecognizedthatthe policy
also targeted servicemembers whose mere statements indicated that they may engage in such conduct. The court then
addressed the military's definition ofhomosexuality, asking
whether it could be interpreted in a manner that did not raise
serious constitutional concerns while remaining consistent
withthemilitary'spurpose. The courtheldthat"[c]onstruing
the regulation to apply to the 'classification of being homosexual' clearly implicates equal protection," because at least
a serious question existed regarding whetheritwould everbe
rational to assume that one class of persons, defined solely
by their sexual preference, would violate conduct-based
regulations while another class would not. Relying on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Powell and Robinson, the
court recognized that "equating status or propensity with
conduct or acts that are prohibited is problematic as well."
Due to these serious constitutional concerns, the
constitutionality of the military's policy was a "close ques-
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ion" only because of the "greater license" that courts give
the military. Rather than interpret the military's definition of
homosexuality in a manner that raised those concerns,
however, the court interpreted the regulation as extending
only to "statements that show aconcrete, fixed, orexpressed
desire to commit homosexual acts despite their being prohibited." Thus, the military went beyond its own objectives
when it presumed that Petty Officer Meinhold desired or

The military's acceptance of

"don't ask, don't tell"
establishes that many of its
former justifications for the
complete ban were smoke
and mirrors masking a formal
policy accommodating the
heterosexual majority's all too
common fear or hatred of
gays and lesbians.
intended to engage in prohibited conduct simply on the basis
of his public statement.
The immediate impact of the Meinholddecision is
Petty OfficerMeinhold's reinstatement- aclearvictory for
him. Commentators have opined that the decision is a
victory for gay rights advocates generally. For example,
Stanford constitutional law professor Kathleen Sullivan said
the decision was "stunning" and "brought into serious question" the "'don't tell' part of [don't ask, don't tell]." 97
However, the grounds for the Meinhold decision were more
narrow and may be more favorable to "don't ask, don't tell"
than the Ninth Circuit's logic in Pruitt.
To its credit, the court in Meinhold,unlike the D.C.
Circuit's en banc decision inSteffan, made acleardistinction
between homosexual status and homosexual conduct, and
recognized that, even though the latter may be prohibited, a
person may not be targeted solely on the basis of the former.
Although the court explicitly stated that its opinion concerned the military's former policy and not "don't ask, don't
tell," its logic certainly suggests that the Ninth Circuit would
interpret the "don't tell" prong of the new policy narrowly:
Ageneral statement that the servicememberis gay orlesbian
would not itselfjustify exclusion.
However, Meinhold marks a departure from Pruitt
to the extent that it assumed without scrutiny that the military
had a legitimate purpose for including a servicemember's
statements in its policy concerning homosexual
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servicemembers. Certain narrowly-circumscribed statements may indeed evidence an intentorpropensity to engage
in legitimately prohibited conduct and may therefore constitute legitimate grounds for separation. The court inMeinhod,
however, did not force the military to prove that it included
a servicemember's statements as relevant in order to identify
those who engage or intend to engage in homosexual conduct. Instead, the court held that it was "obliged" to conduct
its analysis in light of the military's own determination that
the presence of those who fit the military's definition of
homosexual "seriously impairs the accomplishment of the
military mission." Absent from Meinholdis any discussion
of Pruit and its holding that the military may not promulgate
regulations solely for the purpose of comforting heterosexual servicemembers. Nowhere in the opinion does the
court indicate that certain objectives are illegitimate, even if
forwarded by the military. Consequently, the decision may
support a narrow reading of "don't ask, don't tell," but it
does not suggest its complete invalidation.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the political branches have assumed
that, because the courts allowed them in the past to enforce
a complete ban on homosexuals in the military, it will allow
them to enforce any less restrictive policy, whatever its
constitutional implications. In reaching the "don'task, don't
tell" compromise, Congress, the military, and the Administration apparently focused more on political considerations
involved in an issue as closely watched and emotional as
gays in the military rather than on whether the compromise
was constitutional. Thus, the primary goal of the debate
appears to have been to carve out a compromise that would
please the President, the Pentagon, the troops, and, perhaps
most importantly, the public. The effort appears to have
succeeded: a Gallup poll taken after Clinton proposed the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy indicated that, although 51% of
the public still preferred a complete ban on gays in the
military, 58% of the public favored the policy while only
37% disfavored it.98
However, popularity alone cannot save a policy
that violates the Constitution, and recent court decisions
have made it increasingly clear that the judiciary has no
intention of simply rubberstamping "don't ask, don't tell."
Although reluctance to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation and the judiciary's
traditional deference to militaryjudgments have enabled the
military to enforce a complete ban on homosexuals in the
past, the courts should not defer so reverently to "don't ask,
don't tell." Although the courts are not equipped to make
decisions affecting military strategy or procedure, their
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function is to enforce the Constitution, and deference to the
military can only go so far. Public statements from the
military, the President, and the Legislature establish that the
central concern of policy makers is the reaction of heterosexual soldiers, not the abilities of homosexual
servicemembers. No military expertise is required to scrutinize the legality of this intent; rather, it is within the
traditional role of the courts to state whether a governmental
purpose is constitutionally permissible. Members of the
judiciary should not add another round to the game of "don't
ask, don'ttell" by closing theireyes andears and pretending
not to know that the policy has nothing to do with national
security and everything to do with appeasing a vocal contingent that either fears or hates gays and lesbians.
If "don't ask, don't tell" is ultimately struck down
as unconstitutional, the military may have difficulty moving
backto a complete ban. The military's acceptance of "don't
ask, don't tell" establishes that many of its formerjustifications for the complete ban were smoke and mirrors masking
aformal policy accommodating the heterosexual majority's
all too common fear or hatred of gays and lesbians. Thus, in
the end, it is possible that the "don't ask, don't tell" compromise, which has been criticized by gay-rights advocates as
being too restrictive, will lead eventually to a complete
eradication of government-sanctioned discrimination against
homosexuals in the military.
This is not to say that the military will suddenly
become an environment in which heterosexuals must run in
fear from insatiable gays and lesbians. As an initial matter,
the Administration, Congress, and the Pentagon almost
certainly underestimate the tolerance of heterosexual
servicemembers and potential enlistees. Although many of
them mightprefer an entirely heterosexual military community, it is far from certain that heterosexuals will leave the
military or refuse to join simply because homosexuals also
are permitted to enlist. Moreover, a Supreme Court decision
stating that the military may not discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation would not forbid the military from assuring heterosexual servicemembers that they will not be harassed by homosexuals. The military could adopt and
strictly enforce severe penalties for sexual harassment and
non-consensual sexual conduct, whether heterosexual or
homosexual. These penalties would not only protect concemed heterosexual servicemembers, but would also provide a safe working and living environment for every man
and woman serving in our nation's military.
Members of our military have stood against some
of history's most ruthless dictators and have proven to be the
strongest and most effective military force in the world.
They will not run in fear simply because the military con-
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cedes that aservicemember's abilities are not determined by
his or her sexual orientation. "Don't ask, don't tell" is
premised on a prejudice against gays and lesbians, but itjust
as much reflects an unfair stereotype of heterosexual
servicemembers. It also assumes ajudiciary willing to look
the other way. However, recent court opinions suggest that
the judiciary will scrutinize the policy at least to a limited
extent. Whatis still unclearis whetherthe courts will simply
interpret "don't ask, don't tell" narrowly, leaving intact its
general premise, or whether it will gut the policy entirely. In
any event, the days of "see no evil, hear no evil" are over.
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